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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As all of the facts affecting this matter have not
been set out in the brief of appellants, the respondent
is compelled to make some repetition in the following
statement.
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On the 22nd day of November, 1946, an agreement
was entered into by and between Cove Ranch Land
and Livestock Company, a corporation as party of the
first part, the Chipman Investment Company, a corporation, party of the second part, William Chipman,
Alfonzo Chipman, Mae C. Cozzens and Royal Murdock,
Executors and Trustees of the will and Estate of James
Chipman, deceased, parties of the third part, and Clifton
B. Layton, party of the fourth part, wherein the said
Clifton B. Layton, party of the fourth part, purchased
from the said parties of the first, second and third
parts certain real property and personal property known
as the Cove Ranch in Blaine County, State of Idaho for
the sum of $70,000.00 Said ranch consisted of 3,113.91
acres of land, all water and water rights of every nature and description appurtenant to said land and all
improvements located thereon, and all shares of water
in the By-Pass Water Association of Hailey, Idaho and
the United States Taylor Grazing permits as described
in said agreement, and also the Saw Tooth Association
Grazing Stock consisting of 10 shares.
The purchase price of $70,000.00 was to be paid
as follows: $20,000.00 cash on or before the 1st day of
J{anuary, 1947; $50,000.00 cash, together with 5 per cent
interest per annum from August 1, 1946, within one year
from January 21, 1947.
On July 29, 1946 which is
aforementioned agreement, a
titled "Option to Purchase" by
braugh and A. E. Christensen as
Second and Third Parties in the

prior to the date of the
certain agreement enand between Ray Roseagents for the said First,
above referred to agree·
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ment and Clifton B. Layton for himself had been entered into to effect the said purchase and sale.
That on the 22nd day of November, 1946, the same
date as the execution of the agreement for the purchase of the ranch, Clifton B. Layton and Lois Layton,
his wife, made, executed and delivered to A. Edsel
Christensen and Ray Rosebraugh, their certain promissory note in writing in the sum of $10,000.00 and to
secure the payment of said promissory note, also made,
executed and delivered to A. Edsel Christensen and Ray
Rosebraugh a certain mortgage on the real property
known as the Cove Ranch, that said mortgage was recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Blaine
County, Idaho in Book 155 of Mortgages, page 129. The
note and the mortgage were intended to evidence an
obligation on the part of the said Clifton B. Layton
to pay compensation to the said A. Edsel Christensen
and Ray Rosebraugh for the sale of the real estate as
agents under the "Option to Purchase" above referred to.
To more fully explain this mortgage I refer to the
Findings of Fact entered in the foreclosure suit by
Judge D. H. Sutphen under date of October 17, 1949.
(Tr. 45)
'_'At the time of the execution of said mortgage,
the Interest of the said Clifton Layton and Lois
Layton in said property was that of a purchaser
thereof evidenced by a written agreement executed
and delivered on the 22 day of November 1946
between the Cove Ranch Land & Livestock' Com-'
pany and others as vendors and the defendant
Clifton B. Layton as purchaser, wherein the said
Clifton B. Layton contracted to purchase said prop-
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erty from said vendors and at said time said contract was in good standing and the said Clifton B.
Layton and Lois Layton were in actual possession
of said land. That at said time the said Clifton B.
Layton and Lois Layton intended and had agreed
to place a first mortgage on said land to pay the
balance unpaid to the vendors in said agreement as
is evidenced by a supplementary agreement to
second mortgage, a copy of which marked Exhibit
C is attached to the amended supplemental complaint and also attached to said mortgage in the
case as an exhibit. That it was by reason of such
supplementary agreement that said mortgage was
designated a second mortgage. That the terms of
said supplementary agreement to said second mortgage were, however, never carried out and the defendants Clifton B. Layton and Lois Layton did
not execute the intended first mortgage on said
premises.''
At the instance and request of the Laytons, Perry
E. Burnham advanced to the said Clifton B. Layton, as
a temporary loan, the sum of $10,000.00 with which to
make the first payment on said contract and thereafter
advanced the additional sum of $7,000.00 with which
to make the second payment thereon and advanced
further sums of money from time to time in payment
of taxes and other expenses; that approximately $8,000.00
was paid on account of the purchase price by the sale
and exchange of lands and on January 21, 1948, there
remained unpaid the sum of $46,500.00. That the said
Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham at the request
of Layton, paid to the vendors this sum and in order to
secure the repayment of the moneys owed by the Laytons to the Burnhams, title to said Cove Ranch proper-
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ties and to personal property located thereon, including
livestock and machinery belonging to the Laytons, was
placed in _the names of the Burnhams as security holders, and not otherwise. The Laytons, however, continued in possession of said ranch properties and managed and operated the same. (Tr. 138)
On November 7, 1947, the said Clifton B. Layton
executed and delivered to Jack Layton, his son, an
assignment of his interest in said contract of purchase
and the assignment was duly filed for record and recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Blaine
County, Idaho in Book 149, page 233.
Thereafter, in May 1948, the Burnhams and Laytons negotiated the sale of the Cove Ranch properties,
including livestock and equipment situated thereon,
to Carl H. Randall, Edward Randall and Oriel Randall,
for a total purchase price of $140,000.00 The said Randalls entered into a written contract for the purchase
of said "Cove Ranch" and personal property, from the
said Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham, for said
amount. Said contract was entered into by the said
Burnhams as trustees for the Laytons and on their own
behalf for the purpose of obtaining a repayment of all
moneys due and owing Burnhams by the Laytons, in connection with the loans and advances made by them.
At the time of the execution of said contract referred
to with the said Randalls, the Burnhams accepted from
the said Carl H. Randall, Edward Randall and Oriel
Randall three promissory notes, each in the principal
amount of $25,000.00 to be secured by mortgages on
certain real property, which said notes and the mort-
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gages thereafter delivered were taken as a cash item
in full payment of all obligations therefore and then
owing by the Laytons to the Burnhams. (Tr. 138).
Thereafter the Burnhams treated said notes and mortgages as their own personal property received as partial payment thereon cattle of the value of $25,000.00,
$12,762.46 in cash from sale of crops produced in 1948
and upon their own initiative and without authority
from the Laytons, compromised and settled the balance
of said obligations prior to the time the same became
due.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of the indebtedness owing by Laytons to the Burnhams by the acceptance of the notes and mortgages referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Burnhams thereafter exercised
control over said Cove Ranch to the exclusion of the
Laytons. However, Burnhams' right to the said property
ceased at the time of the execution of said contract of sale
with the Randalls. In connection with subsequent transactions, the Burnhams received from said ranch properties various sums of money which belonged to the Laytons, to-wit:
August 6, 1948-from sale of horses in 1948

$ 266.60

April 6, 1949-James A. Baird (down payment on
purchase of ranch)
5,000.00
October 31,' 1949-From sale of crops produced
in 1949.
3,874.86
September 12, 1950-From Albert E. Reid and
others on final sale.
81,085.74
Total

$89,277.20
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On the 24th day of January, 1947, the said A. E.
Christensen and Ray Rosebraugh instituted suit for
judgment upon the said note from the said Clifton
B. Layton and to foreclose the mortgage given to secure the said promissory note. After the institution of
said suit, the said A. E. Christensen and Ray Rosebraugh
assigned and transferred said note and mortgage to one,
Walter Stewart and the said Walter Stewart filed an
Amended and Supplemental Complaint for judgment
upon said note and for the fore~losure of the mortgage
and made the appellants in this action as well as Clifton
B. Layton and his wife and Jack B. Layton and his wife,
parties defendant to the suit.
Answers were made by the appellants herein to
said Amended Complaint and by Clifton B. Layton
and Jack Layton, the assignee of the interest of the
said Clifton B. Layton. (Tr. 32-43)
On April 15, 1948 a purported notice of cancellation
of agreement was executed by Perry E. Burnham and
L. Earl Burnham addressed to Clifton B. Layton and
his wife, Jack Layton and his wife, A. Edsel Christensen
and Ray W. Rosebraugh purporting to cancel the agreement theretofore existing between Cove Ranch Land
and Livestock Company, a corporation et al and the
said Clifton B. Layton.
A trial of the issues made by the pleadings in the
foreclosure suit was had in the District Court for Blaine
County, Idaho and said Court made findings, drew conclusions and entered its Judgment and Decree in said
matter. (Tr. 44-56)
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The court found that "At the time of the execution
of said mortgage the interest of the said Clifton Layton
and Lois Layton in said property was that of a purchaser thereof."
"That the said Burnhams did not give the plaintiff
in the foreclosure action or the said Christensen and
Rosebraugh or any of them an opportunity to pay the
balance unpaid on said contract of November 22, 1945,
and did not give any of such persons advance notice
of their intention to forfeit said contract and did not at
any time tender to Christensen and Rosebraugh or the
plaintiff or any of them a deed to the property described
in said agreement of November 22, 1946, or any part or
portion thereof." (Tr. 47)
The Honorable Judge of the District Court of the
United States, for the District of Utah (Central Division) in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in the suit for accounting brought by the Laytons vs.
Burnhams makes the following finding:
"The Plaintiff (Laytons) have at no time by an
agreement with the Defendants (Burnhams) or
otherwise, altered the fundamental security relationship which originally existed between the parties except that Plaintiffs, (Laytons) authorized
the Defendants (Burnhams) to receive from the
Randall Brothers $75,000.00 in notes and mortgages
as a cash item in payment of all obligations theretofore and then owing by Plaintiffs to Defendants,
which agreement was fulfilled." (Tr. 140-141)
The Decree of Foreclosure gave judgment to Walter
Stewart the plaintiff herein for the sum of $10,000.00
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and interest, attorneys' fees and costs decreed the judgment as a lien on the Cove Ranch property, which said
lien was subject only to a prior claim in favor of Perry
E. Burnham, etc. (Tr. 54-55)
Thereafter the District Court for Blaine County,
Idaho, issued an order for the sale of the said Cove Ranch
property pursuant to the Judgment and pursuant to
said Order, said property was sold by Sheriff of Blaine
County, Idaho at which sale the appellants, Perry E.
Burnham and L. Earl Burnham became the purchasers
and the said Sheriff issued to them a certificate of sale of
said property. The certificate of sale being dated June
9, 1950. (Tr. 59-61)
The defendants Clifton B. Layton, Jack B. Layton
and Grace Layton filed their motion for an Order fixing and determining the amounts necessary for redemption and pursuant to the said motion an Order was
entered by the Court fixing the amount of redemption
in the sum of $80,542.90 with 6 per cent interest. (Tr.
63)

The Order of Sale signed by D. H. Sutphen, Judge,
on May 3', 1950, reads as follows: "That the property
therein described be sold by the Sheriff of Blaine
County, "Idaho, in one parcel and in the manner provided by law and the practice of this Court, subject to
the statutory right of redemption which may exist in
favor of the defendants or either of them." (Tr. 58)
The respondents, Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his
wife, are assignees of the rights of redemption claimed
by Clifton B. Layton, Jack Layton and also hold Quit
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Claims Deeds from the said Clifton B. Layton, Jack
Layton and his wife of the property known as the Cove
Ranch property.
On September 11, 1950 the respondents, Albert E.
Reid and Leah Reid, his wife, paid to the appellants
the sum of $81,085.74 with an additional 6 per cent per
annum interest on $80,542.90 from September 9, 1950,
which said sum included reinbursement to the appellants of the full amount of redemption fixed by the
Court by the Order and also included reimbursement
to the appellants for all water assessments, including
water assessments paid by the appellants for the year
1950, and also included reimbursement for all taxes
paid plus interest and reimbursement for the taxes of
$2,514.75 for the years 1948 and 1949 plus interest
thereon. Therefore the appellants were made whole for
every expenditure made by them and also received
$81,085.74 to which they were not entitled according to
the Findings of Fac.h under the accounting action in the
District Court of the United States, for the District of
Utah. (Tr. 139)
Prior to making redemption as aforesaid, to-wit:
on September 6, 1950 the appellants herein and the
respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid entered into
a contract in writing in which among other things, it
was agreed:
" ( 1) That of the landlord's share of the crop
upon the land being redeemed and which has been
raised and will be harvested as, of and during the
crop year of 1950 and being one-third of such
landlord's share shall be paid over to first parties,
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the defendants herein (the Reids) free and clear of
all claims by second parties; the remaining two
thirds of such landlord's share of the 1950 crop
shall be sold as the same is harvested and the proceeds placed in escrow with the Zion's Savings
Bank and Trust Company of Salt Lake City, Utah,
there to be held in escrow until declaratory judgment of other agreeable determination can be had
as to the rights of first and second parties thereto;
costs of the said escrow and of determination of
the claims of the parties to the said two-thirds
of the landlord's share of the 1950 crop to be apportioned to the parties and borne by them in the parportion that the parties may finally be determined
to be entitled to the said crop; provided however,
that it is agreed that between first and second
parties two-thirds of all grain and one-half of all
hay of the entire 1950 crop from the said Cove
Ranch shall be considered the property of the 1950
tenants, Nek Stelma and family and provided further that the entire landlord's share of the crop
from one hundred sixty acres of land upon the
said Cove Ranch and described more particularly
as:
The Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter
and a fraction of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; Tax Lot 146, ·.Section 20, Township
1 North, Range 19 East, Boise Meridian.
Also, the North half of the Northwest quarter
of Section 34, Township 1 North, Range 19 East,
Boise Meridian, shall be the property of second
parties free and clear from any claim of first parties and provided that in the event second parties
ultimately receive the said two-third share of the
crop, they will pay the full cost of alfalfa seed for
the year 1950."
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At the time of the sale of said property under
the said judgment, one Nek Stelma was in possession of
said property as a tenant upon a share crop basis under
the terms of which one-third of all wheat grown upon
the said property and one-half of the hay was to go to
the lan~lord. At the time of the execution of the agreement hereinabove referred to between the appellants
and the respondent, the wheat on the said property was
either harvested or was matured and was being harvested and the hay was in stacks. Wheat was sold and
one third of the landlord's share of the proceeds of the
sale amounting to $3,129.08 was paid to the respondents,
and two-thirds of the landlord's share of said wheat sales
was deposited in escrow with Zion's Savings Bank and
Trust Company, Salt Lake City, Utah to await the determination of the ownership of the said money amounting to $6,258.05.
The ownership of the 160 acres referred to in the
agreement dated September 6, 1950 by and between the
appellants and the respondents, is in dispute. The Findings of Fact of the District Court of the United States,
for the District of Utah is to the effect that the appellants hold said 160 acres in trust for the Laytons, together with all water rights in connection therewith
and that said property should be delivered by the Burnhams to the Laytons by appropriate instruments of tranfers. (Tr. 140)
Eighty acres of the 160 acres was received in a trade
for a portion of the original tract covered by the original
agreement of November 22, 1946 between Cove Ranch
Land and Livestock Company, a corporation at al as
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Sellers and Clifton B. Layton, as Buyer and the other
80 acres has always been a part of the Cove Ranch
property. For some unexplainable reason this 80 acre
tract was not described under the mortgage given
by Layton to Rosebraugh and Christensen and therefore
the 160 acres in question was not covered under the foreclosure of the mortgage and was not described in the
redemption certificate. The 160 acres, however, are
contiguous to the Cove Ranch and have always been
farmed with the remainder of'-the Cove Ranch property.
During the 1951 season, 80 acres was leased by the respondents to R. D. Hess who had full possession of the
same, planted, cultivated and harvested the. crops grown
on said tract and received the money for the sale of
said crop. The other 80 acres was leased by the respondents with the balance of Cove Ranch to Nek
Stelma . for the year 1951. The appellants in an
amendment and supplement to their complaint prayed
also for a declaratory judgment adjudging them to be
owners and entitled to the wheat grown on the 160
acres during the year 1951.
The court concluded that the appellants were entitled to $2,340.51 and the respondents Albert E. Reid
and Leah Reid were entitled to $3,917.54 of the escrowed funds with Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company and further:
"That the court cannot terminate the controversy of
the matter referred to in the supplemental to the Complaint and denied the motion for a declaratory judgment in reference to the facts set forth in the supplemental to the complaint."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
POINTS ARGUED BY RESPONDENTS
1. Full payment was made to appellants from other
sources and therefore appellants are not entitled to any
of the escrowed funds.
2. Upon redemption from the foreclosure of the
mortgage the original rights of the Laytons which had
been assigned to respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah
Reid were restored freed of the lien for which the property was sold and as the indebtedness to the appellants
had been completely discharged, the respondents are entitled to all title, right and interest in the property including the right in full to the landlord's share of the
crops.
3. Laytons had the right to redemption and had assigned said right to respondents, Albert E. Reid and Leah
Reid, his wife.
4. The purported notice of cancellation was of no
effect.
5. Respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his
wife, were restored to the position of Clifton B. Layton
at the time of the execution of his note and mortgage in
favor of Rosebraugh and Christensen, with the indebtedness to the appellants paid in full and the Sellers under
the contract paid in full and therefore respondents are
entitled to the whole of said property and all benefits
therefrom.
6. The action as filed was to obtain a declaratory
judgment as to the ownership of the escrowed funds with
Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company and other
matters extrinsic to the issues should not be introduced.
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7. If the case is considered only as the ordinary foreclosure of mortgages, the appellants would be entitled
only to the landlord's share of the crop for the period of
time while they held the certificate of sale, that is from
June 9, 1950 to September 11, 1950, the date that the
respondents made payment and made redemption of the
property.
8. As a dispute exists between the parties as to the
ownership of the 160 acres of land upon which a 1951
crop was raised, as it involves the question of title to
real property in the State of Idaho, this Court has no
jurisdiction of the question raised in the supplemental to
the complaint.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
FULL PAYMENT WAS MADE TO APPELLANTS
FROM OTHER SOURCES AND THEREFORE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY OF THE ESCROWED FUNDS.
Subsequent to the Sheriff's Sale on June 2, 1950,
the District Court for Blaine County, Idaho through D.
H. Sutphen, Judge, pursuant to the motion of Clifton B.
Layton, Jack B. Layton and Grace Layton made an Order
fixing the amount required for the redemption of the
property from the sale to the Burnhams as follows:
Purchase price at Sheriff's Sale --------------------$71,451.06
Interest at 6% from June 2, 1950 ________________
563.77
Taxes paid August 9, 1948 -----------------------Interest at 6% from August 9, 1948____________

3,061.89
357.39
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Taxes paid June 6, 1950 ------------------------------ 2,514.75
Add interest at 6% from June 2, 1950 _______ _
19.83
Water assessments paid April 20, 1950 _______ _ 1,634.22
Add interest at 6% from April 20, 1950 _______ _
24.43
Water assessments paid April 1, 1950 _________ ~
293.22
5.33
Interest at 6% from April 1, 1950 ---------------Sawtooth grazing stock assessment paid
50.00
June 6, 1950 --------------------~--------------------------Interest at 6% from June 6, 1950 _______________ _
.36
Water assessment paid May 15, 1948___________ _ 500.00
66.65
Interest at 6% from May 15, 1948 ---------------TOTAL _________________ ---------------------------~.:_------ .. $80 .542.90
This was the amount set to redeem as of September
9, 1950. (Tr. 6) The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah
Reid on September 11, 1950 paid to the appellants the
sum of $81,085.74 which was the amount determined plus
6% interest from September 9, 1950 to September 11,
1950.
Thus the appellants were made completely whole
for every dollar which they had advanced including moneys paid for taxes and water assessments, including the
water assessments used in the raising of the crops for
the year 1950.
The appellants in connection with the purchase of
the Cove Ranch had loaned to Clifton B. Layton the purchaser the sum of $63,102.25 and the said Clifton B. Layton had purchased from or through one of the appellants,
Perry E. Burnham, certain cattle for which the said
Clifton B. Layton became obligated to pay the sum of
$5.656.00 (Tr. 138) This indebtedness had been com-
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pletely discharged by the appellants taking the three
promissory notes of Carl H. Randall, Edward Randall and
Oriel Randall, each in the principal amount of $25,000.00
to be secured by mortgages on certain real property,
which said notes and the mortgages thereafter delivered were taken as a cash item in full payment of all
obligations theretofore and then owing by the said Layton to the said appellants. (Tr. 138) Notwithstanding the
cancellation of the indebtedness owing by the said Layton to the appellants, the appellants also received from
said ranch properties various other sums and then took
the $81,085.74 from the respondents, which in fact belonged to the Laytons. (Tr. 139)
Obviously, therefore, the appellants are in no way
entitled to any portion of the escrowed funds.
Point 2.
UPON REDEMPTION FROM THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE, THE ORIGINAL RIGHTS
OF THE LAYTONS WHICH HAD BEEN ASSIGNED
TO RESPONDENTS ALBERT E. REID AND LEAH
REID WERE RESTORED FREED OF THE LIEN FOR
WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD AND AS THE
INDEBTEDNESS TO THE APPELLANTS HAD BEEN
COMPLETELY DISCHARGED, THE RESPONDENTS
ARE ENTITLE TO ALL TITLE, RIGHT AND INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY INCLUDING THE RIGHT
IN FULL TO THE LANDLORD'S SHARE OF THE
CROPS.
In Evans vs. City of American Falls, 11 Pac. 2nd,
page 363, citing Idaho C. S. Sec. 6933.
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"The judgment debtor redemptioner may redeem the property. from the purchaser within one
year after the sale on paying the purchaser the
amount of his purchase with 10 per cent thereon in
addition, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase and interest on such
amount; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other
than the judgment under which such purchase was
made, the amount of such lien with interest."
In this case the appellant having acquired title prior
to the expiration of the period of redemption by making
redemption from the original sale, took the land free and
clear from the lien of the original judgment, under
which it had been sold. (See Evans vs. Humphrey, 51
Idaho-5 P 2nd 545)
The language in the Evans case on this point is:
"The title so arising from the redemption was not a
new title. It was merely the original title of the judgment debtor restored of the lien from which the property was sold."
That exact question has been passed upon by the
Court of Appeals of California in construing a statute
identical with Idaho C. S. Sec. 6933 and from which it
was adopted:
"In case of redemption by the judgment debtor
or mortgagor, the effect of the sale is extinguished
and the statute declares he is restored to his estate
in the land, which then, for the first time, becomes
subject to the lien of the unsatisfied portion of the
judgment. The lien attaches then because the effect
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of the sale has been extinguished and the mortgagor
or judgment debtor is the owner of the estate as
though no sale had been made.''
Applying the said statute and the above theory to
the case before the Court.
The title arising from the redemption was not a new
title, it was the original title of the judgment debtor restored freed of the lien for which the property was sold.
The mortgagor or judgment debtor or his assignee or
grantee is the owner of the estate as though no sale had
been made.
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid therefore step into the shoes of the mortgagor and must be
recognized as purchasers under the contract of purchase
and thus have the right to complete the contract of
purchase which they do in paying the appellants in full
all that is owing to them, and the respondents are then
entitled to receive all title, right and interest in the
property purchased under the contract including all
the right or interest of the appellants in the landlord's
share of the crop.
Judge Sutphen, the trial judge, recognized this fact
and made an attempt to adjust all equities involved.
This is specifically shown by the Decree of Foreclosure entered by Judge Sutphen wherein he enters
judgment on the $10,000 note secured by the mortgage
executed by Clifton B. Layton with interest, costs and
attorneys' fees and makes the judgment a lien on the
property described in said mortgage and goes on to say:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

"Which said lien is subject only to a prior claim
in favor of the defendant Perry E. Burnhan1 in
the sum of $17,000.00 together with interest on
$10,000.00 thereof with interest computed at 5 per
cent per annum from December 7, 1946 together with
interest on $7,000.00 thereof from January 15, 1947
at 5 per cent per annum and subject to a prior
claim in favor of the defendants Perry E. Burnham,
and L. Earl Burnham, jointly in the sum of $46,104.35
with interest on said latter sum from February 18,
1948 at 5 per cent per annum." (Tr. 54)
You will note that the $10,000.00 note in favor of
Christensen and Rosebraugh which was secured by the
mortgage which was the subject of the foreclosure ·was
dated January 23', 1947 and you will also note that the
advancement of the sum of $46,104.35 made by the
Burnhams was not until February 18, 1948 more than
a year later, and therefore Judge Sutphen was attempting to adjust all equities in his adjudication of the case.

Point 3.
LAYTONS HAD THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION
AND HAD ASSIGNED SAID RIGHT TO RESPONDENTS, ALBERT E. REID AND LEAH REID, HIS WIFE.
There is no question that Judge Sutphen recognized that the Laytons had the right of redemption as
well as the other defendants. I refer to his letter under
date of December 2, 1949 (Tr. 51) whrein he states:
"As I understand the law, the respective parties
will each have their statutory rede1nption rights
which this Court cannot modify.''
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May it also be called to the Court's attention that
in the Certificate of Redemption which was delivered by
the appellants herein to the respondents upon payment
of the $81,085.74, the appellants made the following
statement:
"That said redemption was made by the said
Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his wife, upon the
following claim of right:
By virtue of assignments of all the rights of
Clifton B. Layton, Jack B. Layton and Mrs. Jack
B. Layton, his wife, by Quit Claim Deeds to Albert
E. Reid and Leah Reid, his wife, now of record in
the office of the County Recorder of Blaine County,
State of Idaho."
Point 4.
THE PURPORTED NOTICE OF CANCELLATION
WAS OF NO EFFECT
If the purported Notice of Cancellation of Agreement was effective as the appellants allege, and the
rights of the Laytons cancelled out, why then did the
Court recognize that the Laytons had the right of
redemption and why did the appellants acknowledge in
the Certificate of Redemption that the respondents herein were making redemption by virtue of the assignments from the Laytons.
In reading the Notice of Cancellation (Tr. 30) it
can be soon determined that the Notice is not in the
alternative as required by law and it can readily be
understood why Judge Sutphen made the statement in
his Findings:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
"That the said Burnhams did not give the plaintiff in the foreclosure action or the said Christensen
and Rosebraugh ar any of them an opportunity to
pay the balance unpaid on the said contract of
November 22, 1945 and did not give any of such
persons advance notice of their intention to forfeit
said contract and did not at any time tender to
Christensen and Rosebraugh or the plaintiff or any
of them a deed to the property described in said
agreement of November 22, 1946 or any part or
portion thereof." (Tr. 47)
If the Notice of Cancellation was not effective as to
Christensen and Rosebraugh, then it was not effective
as to the Laytons, as the purported Notice was addressed to all of them. (Tr. 30)
Permit us to call attention also to the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the Accounting
Action in the District Court of the United States, for the
District of Utah, which states:
"Thereafter, in May 1948 (which is the month
following the purported Notice of Cancellation),
the parties herein negotiated the sale of the Cove
Ranch properties, including livestock and equipment situated thereon, to Carl H. Randall, Edward
Randall and Oriel Randall, for a total purchase
price of $140,000.00. The said Randalls entered into
a written contract for the purchase of said "Cove
Ranch" and personal property, from the Defendants,
Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham, for said
amount. Said contract was entered into by Defendants as trustees for the Plaintiffs, ( Laytons)
and on their own behalf for the purpose of obtaining a repayment of all moneys due and owing Defendants from Plaintiffs (Laytons) in connection
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with the loans and advances made by them." (Tr.
138) * * * "The Plaintiffs have at no time by any
agreement with the Defendants, or otherwise, altered
the fundamental security relationship which originally existed between the parties except that Plaintiffs
authorized the Defendants to receive from the
Randall Brothers $75,000.00 in notes and mortgages
as a cash item in payment of all obligations theretofore and then owing by Plaintiffs to Defendants,
which agreement was fulfilled."
Point 5.
RESPONDENTS ALBERT E. REID AND LEAH
REID, HIS WIFE, WERE RESTORED TO THE POSITION OF CLIFTON B. LAYTON AT THE TIME OF
THE EXECUTION OF HIS NOTE AND MORTGAGE.
IN FAVOR OF ROSEBRAUGH AND CHRISTENSEN,
WITH THE INDEBTEDNESS TO THE APPELLANTS
PAID IN FULL AND THE SELLER UNDER THE
CONTRACT PAID IN FULL AND THEREFORE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE WHOLE OF
SAID PROPERTY AND ALL BENEFITS THEREFROM.
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his
wife, being the assignees and grantees of Clifton B.
Layton, Jack Layton, the assignee of Clifton B. Layton,
and the wife of the said Jack Layton were restored to
the position of Clifton B. Layton at the time of the execution of his note to Christensen and Rosebraugh
and upon payment of the sum of $81,085.74 on .September 11, 1950 were entitled to all of the right, title,
estate and interest of the original Sellers under the
Agreement to sell the Cove Ranch and of course all of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24 .

right, title, estate and interest of the appellants herein
as assignees and grantees of the original sellers, which
right included all rights to the landlord's share of the
crops or the proceeds therefrom. It would certainly
be an unjust enrichment of the appellants to not only
pay them all that they received under the Agreement
of Sale and re-imbursement for taxes, water assessments, including the water assessments for the water
used on the 1950 crop and then also allow them the
landlord's share of the proceeds of the sale of the crops.
Why should the respondents be charged, for instance,
for the water assessments for the water used on the
1950 crops if they are not to receive the benefits from
the payment of the water assessments.
Point 6.
THE ACTION AS FILED WAS TO OBTAIN A
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS TO THE OWNERSHIP OF THE ESCROWED FUNDS WITH ZION'S
SAVINGS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND
OTHER MATTERS EXTRINSIC TO THE ISSUES
SHOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED.
Prior to making redemption, to-wit: On September
6, 1950 the appellants and the respondents entered into
a contract in writing in which among other things, it
was agreed:
( 1) ''That of the landlord's share of the crop
upon the land being redeemed and which has been
raised and will be harvested as, of and during the
crop year of 1950 and being one-third of such landlord's share shall be paid over to first party, the de-
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fendants herein, (Reids, the respondents) free and
clear of all claims by second parties; the remaining
two thirds of such landlord's share of the 1950 crop
shall be sold as the same is harvested and the proceeds placed in escrow with the Zion's Savings Bank
& Trust Company of Salt Lake City, Utah, thereto
be held in escrow until declaratory judgment or
other agreeable determination can be had as to the
rights of first and second parties thereto."
The original proceedings was brought for the purpose of obtaining this declaratory judgment, however the
appellants have tried through the supplemental to the
complaint to bring in extrinsic matters which have no
bearing whatsoever on the issue.
Point 7.
IF THE CASE IS CONSIDERED ONLY AS THE
ORDINARY FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE, THE
APPELLANTS WOULD BE ENTITLED ONLY TO THE
LANDLORD'S SHARE OF THE CROP FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME WHILE THEY HELD THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE, THAT IS FROM JUNE 9, 1950 TO
SEPTEMBER 11, 1950, THE DATE THAT THE RESPONDENTS MAI)E PAYMENT AND MADE REDEMPTION OF THE PROPERTY.
If we completely ignore the theories as set forth in
the above and foregoing arguments and look at the
case as the ordinary foreclosure of a mortgage and the
rights that exist between the purchaser under the foreclosure sale and the redemptioner, permit me to refer
you to the following:
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Ferguson vs. Sullivan, 74 P2nd 183. (An Idaho case)
"A purchaser of land at execution sale on mortgage foreclosure must pro-rate crop or cash rental
for entire year in which sale was made and certificate issued with judgment debtor-mortgagor on
basis of portion of year preceding and following
date of sale."
The facts in the Ferguson vs. Sullivan case are as
follows:
"The appellant was the owner of a tract of
farm land in Latah County, Idaho and executed a
mortgage thereon in favor of respondent. Default
was made in payment of the mortgage debt and foreclosure was had, and on execution sale which occured May 26, 1936, respondent bid in the property.
At the time of the sale, the land was in the possession of and being cultivated by one Virgil Hurlbert, who was a lessee of the property under which
is known as a crop lease whereby he had contracted
to deliver to the landlord (appellant) 'one third of
the crop delivered in the warehouse at Genessee,
Idaho as annual rental of the place.' When the
crop matured it was harvested by Hurlbert and
stored in the warehouse in accordance with the
terms of the lease, and upon demand of the purchaser under the foreclosure, Hurlbert attorned
to the defendant as landlord and delivered to him
the entire one third of the crop. After the expiration of the cropping and leasehold year, plaintiff
made demand on defendant for the proportionate
share of the crop rent, which was the time elapsed
from the first of the leasehold year to the date of
the sale bears to the entire year, on the theory
that all earned rental to the date of the execution sale
belonging to the plaintiff and that defendant was
entitled to collect only rentals accruing after that
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date. Defendant refused the demand and this action was commenced for the collection of a proportionate share of the rents which it is claimed is
240j365 of 47,813 pounds of wheat.
The question: Is the purchaser at execution sale
on foreclosure entitled to receive and retain all of the
grain or crop rental from the entire year in which
the sale is made and the certificate is issued, or
must he prorate with the judgment debtor for the
portion of the year which has expired prior to the
time of sale?
Section 8-406 Idaho Code Annotated.
"Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the Court may restrain the commission of
waste on the property, by order granted with or
without notice, on the application of the purchaser
or the judgment creditor. But it is not waste for
the person in possession of the property at the time
of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during
the period allowed for redemption to continue to
use it in the same manner in which it was previously used; or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry; or to make the necessary repairs or building thereon or to use wood or timber on the property
therefore; or for the repair of fences; or for fuel
in his family, while he occupies the property."
Section 8-407 Idaho Code Annotated:
"The purchaser from the time of the sale until
a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of
his redemption until another redemption is enti tied to receive, from the tenant in possession, the
rents of the property sold or the value of the use and
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits
have been received by the judgment creditor or
purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the property
thus sold preceding such redemption·, the amount of
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such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the
redemption money to be paid."
Same as Sections 706-707 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, considered in the California case of
Clarke vs. Cobb, 121 Cal. 595, 54 P. 74 Reynolds vs.
Lathrop 7 Calif. 43, wherein the Court comments as
follows:
"It must be borne in mind that the whole matter
of redemption is purely statutory, and the statute
seems to contemplate a proportionate division of
the rents. It was intended by this statute to give the
purchaser at the sale the fruits of the land produced
while he held the certificate of purchase; only this
and nothing more. To support a construction which
would give the purchaser at the sale (perchance,
a purchaser for. a single day) the rents of property
under a lease for years, for the sole reason that rents
for the entire period happen to become due and
payable upon that day, would seem to wander far
from the intention of the legislature in enacting the
statute."
First National Bank of Yuma vs. Maxey, 34 Ariz.
438, 272 P. 641, states that Arizona adopted the same
statute; quoting:
"On examining the statute carefully, it appears.
the primary object thereof was to change the old
rule that rent could not be apportioned and that it
followed the legal title at the time it was due, to
the principle that it was apportionable on the basis
of the title at the time it was earned. That the
legislature intended the earned rent to follow the
complete title is shown by the remainder of the
statute cited which provides that, in case of a re-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

demption, the purchaser accounts to the redemptioner for the rents collected during the time the former held the certificate of sale. In other words,
while the mortgagor holds both legal and equitable
title, he is entitled to the rent earned; when he
loses the equitable title, the earned rent goes to the
one who has purchased it, and who presumably will
eventually secure the legal title also. Should there
be a redemption, however, and both legal and
equitable title pass to someone else, that person receives the rent, dating back to the time when the
mortgagor no longer held both titles, the rent thus
belongs eventually to the ultimate holder of both
the legal and equitable title, according to the time it
was earned."
Under Ferguson vs. Sullivan, 74 P2nd 183, the
Court holds:
"Under this statute the purchaser was only entitled to receive, the value of the use and occupation of the premises from the date of sale, May 25
and not from the beginning of the year. For the
same reason the original owner was entitled to the
value for the use and occupation of the premises
up to the time she lost the title."
Applying the statute and the rulings in the above
cited cases and relying upon the foreclosure only, all that
the appellants could hope to recover would be the landlord's share of the crop for the period of time \vhile
they held the certificate of sale, that is from June 9,
1950 to September 11, 1950, the date that the defendants
made payment and made redemption of the property.
And we do not concede this, in view of our theory
that the appellants as assignees of the original contract
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were paid in full and that the respondents as assignees
of the original purchaser were placed in the shoes of the
original purchaser and entitled to all the rights, privileges, claims and title that the original purchaser
bargained for.
Point 8.
AS A DISPUTE EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO TI-IE OWNERSHIP OF THE 160 ACRES
OF LAND UPON WHICH A 1951 CROP WAS RAISED,
AS IT INVOLVES THE QUESTION OF TI'rLE TO
REAL, PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF IDAliO, THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OF THE QUESTIOl'I
RAISED IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE COMPLAINT.
As this question raises the jurisdictional question
as to who is the owner of the 160 acres in di.spute,
upon which a 1951 crop was raised and which is referred to by the appellants in the amendment and supplement to the complaint, we are of the opinion that this
matter can only be settled by the Idaho court where
the property is located. There are many questions invalved in this dispute over the 160 acres of land, such
as the question of a trade of 80 acres of the described
land under the original agreement for the sale of the
Cove Ranch for 80 acres of the disputed land; the fact
that the other 80 acres of the disputed land was not included under the original agreement but neverthele')s
was always recognized as part of the Cove Ranch and
cultivated with the balance of the 3,113.91 acres of land.
There are also questions of the rights of the partie.; to
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the 1951 crop in view of the fact that 80 acres of the
disputed land was leased to one,. R. D. Hess and that
he had possession, planted, cultivated and harvested
the crops and received the money for the sale of the "arne;
and that the other 80 acres was leased to N ek Stelma by
the respondents herein with the balance of the Cove
Ranch for the year 1951.
CROSS APPEAL
(1) The

Court erred In awarding appellants
$2,340.51 of the funds escrowed with Zion's Savings
Bank and Trust Company.
(2) The

Court erred in allowing respondents
$3,917.54 only of the funds escrowed with Zion's Savings
Bank and Trust Company.
ARGUMENT:
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his
wife, on September 11, 1950 paid to the appellants the
sum of $81,085.74 which was the amount determined by
the District Court of Blaine County, State of Idaho, plus
interest at 6% per annum from September 9, 1950 to
September 11, 1950, as being the amount required for
the redemption.
This amount included all taxes, water assessments
and grazing right assessments, including the water assessments used in the raising of the crops for the year
1950.
The appellants had prior to this time received
$75,000.00 in notes secured by mortgages as a cash item
in full payment of all obligations therefore owing by
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the Laytons to the appellants, therefore the money paid
by the respondents for the redemption did not belong
to the appellants.
Therefore the appellants are in no way entitled to
any portion of the escrowed funds.
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid,
his wife, being the assignees of the right of redemption
and also grantees under deeds from Clifton B. Layton,
Jack Layton, the assignee of Clifton B. Layton, and the
wife of the said Jack B. Layton, were restored to the
position of Clifton B. Layton and are entitled to all of
the right, ti1le estate and interest of the said Clifton B.
Layton, who as purchaser· of the said Cove Ranch, had
made full settlement with the vendors of the Cove
Ranch and with the appellants by repayment of all
moneys due and owing to the appellants in connection
with the loans and advances made by them to him; which
said right included all rights to the landlord's share
of the crops or proceeds therefrom, the total amount
of the escrowed funds, $6,258.05.
WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully submit:
That a mandate be issued from this Court ordering
the trial court to modify the declaratory judgment by
awarding to the respondents Albert E. Reid, and Leah
Reid, the total amount of the escrowed funds in the sum
of $6,258.05.
Respectfully submitted,
Le Grand P. Backman
of Backman, Backman and Clark,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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